Volume 34

Issue 3

Article 13

1989

To Be or Not to Be: The Pennsylvania General Assembly
Eliminates Wrongful Birth and Life Actions
John Lyons

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
John Lyons, To Be or Not to Be: The Pennsylvania General Assembly Eliminates Wrongful Birth and Life
Actions, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 681 (1989).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Lyons: To Be or Not to Be: The Pennsylvania General Assembly Eliminates

1989]
TO BE OR NOT TO BE: THE PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ELIMINATES WRONGFUL BIRTH
AND LIFE ACTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 22, 1988, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted
the Freind Amendment' prohibiting wrongful birth and wrongful life
tort actions. 2 The Freind Amendment was the culmination of a series of
1. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8305-8306 (Purdon Supp. 1989). For the
text of the Freind Amendment, see infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The
amendment was introduced on March 22, 1988, by Representative Steven
Freind in the House of Representatives for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
to add the Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Act to omnibus legislation amending Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes. See LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 172d Sess., at 303 (1988) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE].

2. The wrongful birth tort action is generally brought by parents seeking
damages for the negligent act or omission of a physician resulting in the birth of
an unwanted child. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 55, at 370 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
Typically, physicians have been sued for wrongful birth of unwanted children
where the physician negligently performed an unsuccessful abortion procedure
or failed to diagnose or inform the child's parents of possible birth defects which
would have influenced the parents' decision whether to keep or abort the child.
Id.; see generally Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2017 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Wrongful Birth Actions]. For a
discussion of Pennsylvania case law concerning the wrongful birth cause of action prior to the Freind Amendment, see infra notes 8-19 and accompanying
text.
Wrongful life tort actions are brought either by the child in his or her own
right or by the child's parents in their capacity as guardians. See, e.g., Ellis v.
Sherman, 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986). The child seeks damages from the
physician for wrongful existence due to the physician's negligent act or omission
which gave rise to the child's birth. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 55, at 370.
Courts have balked at allowing this tort claim since the fundamental precept of
tort recovery, the restoration of the aggrieved party to his or her whole self as if
the tortious conduct had not occurred, necessitates a "comparison between life
in an impaired state and nonexistence." Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1979). See generally Comment,
Wlrongfid Life: Should the Action Be Allowed?, 47 LA. L. REV. 1319 (1987); Note, A
Cause of Action for "Wrongfi Life". A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58
(1970). For a discussion of case law in Pennsylvania rejecting the wrongful life
cause of action, see infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
The Freind Amendment does not prohibit causes of action based on
"wrongful conception," sometimes called "wrongful pregnancy" actions. See
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 308 (statement of Rep. Freind).
Wrongful conception suits are brought by parents against physicians who have
negligently performed unsuccessful sterilization operations resulting in the birth
of unwanted children, usually foreseeably deformed. For a discussion of Pennsylvania case law allowing this cause of action and the remedies available to the
aggrieved party, see infra notes 9, 18-19 and accompanying text. For a discus-

(681)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 13

682

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 681

legislative attempts to override Speck v. Finegold,3 the Pennsylvania
4
Supreme Court decision which validated claims for wrongful birth.
The Freind Amendment eliminates claims alleging that "but for [the] act
or omission" of a defendant, "a person once conceived would not or
should not have been born."' 5 It also bars claims alleging that "but for
[the] act or omission" of a defendant, a "person would not have been
conceived or, once conceived would or should have been aborted."" Finally, the Freind Amendment prevents a defendant from asserting that
the aggrieved party's failure to abort an injured fetus operates as a complete bar to recovery or as a factor to mitigate damages on an in utero
7
injury claim.
sion of the legislative history of the Freind Amendment and its intended effect
on the wrongful conception cause of action, see infra notes 20-33 & 44-48 and
accompanying text.
3. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam). For a detailed analysis of
the Speck decision, see infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
4. Provisions almost identical to the Freind Amendment were passed by the
General Assembly and vetoed by Governor Thornburgh four years earlier. See
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 304. The bill was subsequently
resurrected in May, 1987, in the Abortion Control Act (H.B. 1362). Governor
Casey later vetoed the entire Abortion Control Act. Id. at 304-05. Finally, Representative Freind attached the current law as an amendment to the judiciary
omnibus bill (SB 646) on February 24, 1988. Id. at 303. After an extensive and
often acrimonious floor debate, the House voted 145 to 49 in favor of the constitutionality of the Freind Amendment. Id. at 316-17. Subsequently, the House
approved the Freind Amendment by a vote of 144 to 50. Id. at 317. After passing the omnibus bill, the House sent the bill to the Senate. Id. at 325. The
Senate, after a heated floor debate, passed the bill by a vote of 31 to 16 on

March 22, 1988. See

LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE FOR THE COMMON-

WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 172d Sess., at 1966 (1988) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
JOURNAL-SENATE]. Governor Casey signed and approved the bill on April 18,

1988. See id. at 2061.
5. 42 PA. CONS.
8305(a) provides:

STAT.

ANN.

§ 8305(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).

Section

[T]here shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of

any person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the

defendant, a person once conceived would not or should not have been
born. Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit any cause of action or award of damages for the wrongful death of
a woman, or on account of physical injury suffered by a woman or a
child, as a result of an attempted abortion. Nothing contained in this
subsection shall be construed to provide a defense against any proceeding charging a health care practitioner with intentional misrepresentation under... any... act regulating the professional practices of health
care practitioners.
Id.
6. Id. § 8305(b). Section 8305(b) provides, in full: "There shall be no
cause of action on behalf of any person based on a claim of that person that, but

for an act or omission of the defendant, the person would not have been conceived or, once conceived, would or should have been aborted." Id.
7. Id. § 8306. Section 8306 provides:
Where a person has, by reason of the wrongful act or negligence of
another, sustained injury while in utero, it shall not be a defense to any
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This article will examine the history and substance of the Freind
Amendment and will analyze the effect it may have on prenatal tort
claims in Pennsylvania. This article will also examine the validity of the
Freind Amendment under the United States Constitution. This article
will conclude that the Freind Amendment is not only constitutional, but
that it furthers legitimate state policies as well.
II.

WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE TORT ACTIONS PRIOR TO
THE FREIND AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first addressed the issues of
wrongful birth and wrongful life in 1981 in the case of Speck v. Finegold.8
At that time the lower courts had regarded these issues with uncertainty.!) The Speck court held that the parents of a deformed child could
sue a physician for negligent acts that resulted in the wrongful birth of a
action brought to recover damages for the injury, or a factor in mitigation of damages, that the person could or should have been aborted.
Id.
For a discussion of Pennsylvania case law leading up to the Freind Amendment, see infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legislative history and the provisions of the Freind Amendment, see infra notes 20-33
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the impact of the Freind Amendment in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 34-79 and accompanying text.
8. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
9. See, e.g., Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239
(1980) (unsuccessful sterilization giving rise to birth of deformed child was actionable under wrongful birth tort principles but recovery limited to expenses
incident to birth and raising child and medical expenses for treatment of child's
birth defect); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366
(1981) (unsuccessful tubal ligation resulting in birth of normal healthy child is
grounds for cause of action for wrongful birth but not wrongful life; recovery
limited to actual expenses for birth and raising child offset by benefit to parents
from comfort and society of child), vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 487, 453 A.2d 974, 976
(1982) (although cause of action existed under wrongful birth, recovery limited
solely to expenses incident to birth); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408
A.2d 496 (1979) (wrongful birth action allowed but wrongful life action denied;
damages for wrongful birth limited to expenses of birth and rearing of deformed
child), aff'd in part and revd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
In two of the lower court decisions, the distinction between wrongful conception and wrongful birth causes of action was blurred. See Stribling, 288 Pa.
Super. at 443-44, 432 A.2d at 243 (even though parents sued physician for negligently performed sterilization, court never distinguishes between wrongful conception and wrongful birth theories); Mason, 286 Pa. Super. at 357, 428 A.2d at
1367 (lower court uses wrongful birth and wrongful life terms interchangeably
in wrongful conception suit).
This distinction is critically important because the Freind Amendment bars
only wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action and allows causes of action for wrongful conception. For an exposition of the elements of wrongful
birth, wrongful life and wrongful conception causes of action, see supra note 2
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Freind
Amendment and its impact on wrongful conception causes of action, see infra
notes 20-33 & 44-49 and accompanying text.
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deformed child.I" The court further held that the damages on this claim
included "expenses attributable to the birth and raising of" the deformed child and any "damages for mental distress and physical inconvenience attributable" to the birth of the child. I I By reason of a three10. Speck, 497 Pa. at 79, 439 A.2d at 111. The Speck case involved two alleged negligent actions. First, a urologist failed to perform a successful vasectomy on Mr. Speck resulting in Mrs. Speck's impregnation. Id. at 82, 439 A.2d
at 113. Second, a different physician failed to successfully abort the fetus. Id.
The Specks had engaged the services of Dr. Finegold, a urologist, to perform a bilateral vas ligation on Mr. Speck to prevent the conception of a possibly
deformed child. Id. Mr. Speck suffered from a genetic defect known as
neurofibromatosis. Id. at 81, 439 A.2d at 112. After having two children born
with this hereditary disease, the Specks decided against the possibility of having
a third afflicted child. Id. at 81-82, 439 A.2d at 112-13.
After conception, the Specks engaged the services of Dr. Schwartz to terminate the pregnancy. Id. at 82, 439 A.2d at 113. Dr. Schwartz consistently represented to the Specks that the abortion had been successful. Id. Five months
later Mrs. Speck gave birth to a daughter afflicted with neurofibromatosis. Id.
The Speck court patched together a majority of justices to recognize a
wrongful birth cause of action. See id. at 79, 439 A.2d at 111. Justice (now Chief
Justice) Nix dissented, asserting that in the "absence of unanimity of public
opinion," extension of tort principles intruded upon the province of the legislature to set public policy. Id. at 99, 439 A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting). The
legislature met Justice Nix's challenge by passing the Freind Amendment after
five years of unsuccessful attempts. For a discussion of past attempts of the General Assembly to pass anti-wrongful birth and life laws, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
11. Speck, 497 Pa. at 79-80, 439 A.2d at 111-12. Child-rearing damages
awarded under this language parallel damages recoverable in wrongful conception cases. See, e.g., Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 441, 432 A.2d
239, 242 (1980) (but for defendant's breach of duty of care to parents, costs of
rearing child would not have been incurred, and thus were proper items of damage); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 363, 428 A.2d 1366,
1370 (1981) (child-rearing costs included in damage assessment), vacated, 499
Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 368-69,
408 A.2d 496, 510 (1979) (Price, J., dissenting in part) (child-rearing costs not
compensable even if child deformed since no parent is guaranteed healthy
child), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
The lower courts have espoused the "benefit rule," which offsets any damages recoverable for child-rearing expenses by the "child's aid, comfort and society" during the parents' lives. See, e.g., lason, 286 Pa. Super. at 363, 428 A.2d
at 1370.
The Second Restatement of Torts states the benefit rule as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Speck and i.1ason addressed the application of the benefit rule. Although the Speck court's opinion was silent oil the
issue of the benefit rule in its order granting relief, Justice Roberts, in his separate opinion, assumed that application of the benefit rule would allow the "benefits ofjoy, companionship, and affection" to offset child-rearing damages. Speck,
497 Pa. at 90, 439 A.2d at 117 (Roberts, J., concurring).
In Mason, the supreme court expressly prohibited child-rearing damages for
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three split, however, the court let stand the lower court decision prohib12
iting the child's wrongful life action.
The Speck court justified its extension of common law tort principles
on the basis of the defendant physician's duty of care to the parents,
who had interests entitled to legal protection. '3 Further, the Speck court
set out three important public policies outweighing the policy of favoring childbirth over abortion: compensation to victims, deterrence of
negligent conduct and encouragement of due care.1 4 Citing the " 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm" by holding tortfeasors fully
accountable for their conduct, the Speck court stated that recognition of
wrongful birth claims was an important safeguard against future tortious
acts. 15
The Speck court joined the vast majority of other jurisdictions in declining to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life. 16 Amidst an
acerbic attack by those justices on the court favoring this cause of action,
the court let stand the lower court decision prohibiting wrongful life
actions. 17
a healthy child because the benefits enjoyed by parents in raising a child offset
any costs as a matter of law. Mason, 499 Pa. at 487, 453 A.2d at 976. For a discussion of the Mason decision, see infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
Thus, although there is clear language in Mason adopting a per se benefit
rule barring child-rearing damages for a healthy child, it is unclear whether the
benefit rule will operate to mitigate child-rearing damages for a deformed child
under a wrongful conception claim. See id. at 497, 453 A.2d at 981 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting in part) (parents should be awarded full costs of rearing child without
benefit rule offset because rule "punishes" endearing parents and ignores deterrence of future negligence).
12. Speck, 497 Pa. at 80, 439 A.2d at 112. Justices Roberts and Nix and
ChiefJustice O'Brien voted to affirm the lower court decision while Justices Flaherty, Kauffman and Larsen voted to reverse. Id.
13. Id. at 84, 439 A.2d at 114. The Speck court held that "the concept of
duty amounts to no more than 'the sum total of those considerations of policy
which led the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' from
the harm suffered." Id. (quoting Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 164, 404 A.2d 672,
681 (1979) (citation omitted)). Justice Nix, in dissent, criticized the court for
allowing itself to "[judicially legislate two new causes of action heretofore nonexistent in this Commonwealth." Id. at 94, 439 A.2d at 119 (Nix, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added by Justice Nix). He further stated: "Only in the clearest cases...
may a court make an alleged public policy the basis ofjudicial decision." Id. at 98, 439
A.2d at 121 (Nix, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice Nix) (quoting Mainlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941)). Noting that the residents of the Commonwealth were evenly divided on the issue of abortion,
Justice Nix chastised the court for its "flagrant misuse of [its] role as a tribunal
designed to implement societal values and not to create them." Id. at 99, 439
A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 85, 439 A.2d at 114.
15. Id. at 85-86, 439 A.2d at 114-15. (quoting Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 599, 305 A.2d 877, 884 (1973)).
16. Id. at 80, 439 A.2d at 112; see Annotation, Tort Liability for ll'rongfully
Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 66-76 (1978 & Supp. 1988) (discussing
case law concerning wrongful life actions in various jurisdictions).
17. Speck, 497 Pa. at 80, 439 A.2d at 112. Justice Flaherty, writing the lead
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One year later, in Mllason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital,", the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania defined damages recoverable to parents
on a wrongful conception claim resulting in the birth of a healthy child.
The Mason court limited recovery to costs associated with pregnancy and
delivery, and denied recovery of financial or emotional costs incident to
raising the healthy child.l''
III.

THE FREIND AMENDMENT: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESPONSE
TO SPECK Iv FINEGOLD

Seven years after the Speck decision, in the early spring of 1988, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Freind Amendment after
heated debate.2 ( The Freind Amendment contains three distinct proviopinion for the court, was joined by only Justices Kauffman and Larsen in advocating the adoption of wrongful life tort actions. Id. Justice Flaherty criticized
the New York Court of Appeals for rejecting wrongful life tort actions in Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1979). Speck,
497 Pa. at 86, 439 A.2d at 115. Justice Flaherty stated that the Becker court's
declared incompetence to decide whether it is better to never have been born
than to be born with gross deficiencies did not provide adequate rationale to
justify elimination of the wrongful life cause of action. Id. (referring without
citation to Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900).
Justice Flaherty criticized the Becker court for denying recovery to an aggrieved
plaintiff solely because the court could not "calculate damages based upon a
comparison between life in an impaired state and nonexistence." Id. (referring
without citation to Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
900). The Becker court's "hyper-scholastic rationale" denying recovery failed to
take into account that a "diseased plaintiff exists and . . . would not exist at all
but for the negligence of the defendants." Id. at 87, 439 A.2d at 115. To deny
recovery to the injured plaintiff would imply that his only "alternative remedy, in
the extreme event that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is suicide." Id.
Three years later, a lower court followed the Speck decision in denying a
Tay-Sachs child the right to sue for his wrongful life. Rubin v. Hamot Medical
Center, 329 Pa. Super. 439, 445, 478 A.2d 869, 872 (1984), appeal granted, 508
Pa. 493, 498 A.2d 868 (1985).
18. 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982). Mlason involved an action to recover
damages in connection with an alleged improper performance of a sterilization
operation. Id. at 486, 453 A.2d at 975.
19. Id. The Mason court allowed the parent to recover "'all medical expenses and lost wages related to pre-natal care, delivery, and post-natal care, as
well as compensation for pain and suffering incurred during the pre-natal
through post-natal periods." Id. at 486, 453 A.2d at 976. For a discussion of the
i'reind Amendment's impact on wrongful conception claims, see infra notes 4448 and accompanying text.
20. See LEGISLATIVE JOURNAI.-HoUISE, supra note 1, at 303-17; LEGISLATIvE
JOURNAL-SENATE, stipra note 4, at 1960-66. The House debate was led by the

amendment's sponsor, Representative Freind. Lrc;IS,ATX'E JOURNA1,-HtJSI.,
supra note 1, at 303. Representative Freind outlined the amendment's provisions and answered specific questions regarding its intended impact. Id. at 30316.
The legislators divided into the pro-life and pro-choice camps. Statoents
on both sides were sharp. Representative Harper responded to Reprcsentative
Freind's proposal: "ITihere you go again, trying to legislate your cruel legislation on women." Id. at 310. Representative Birmelin responded that Represen-
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sions: (1) a provision prohibiting wrongful birth actions;' 1 (2) a provision prohibiting wrongful life actions;2 2 and (3) a provision barring
23
abortion defenses against in utero claims.
The wrongful birth provision, by far the most controversial of the
three, denies a plaintiff the ability to assert a claim alleging that "but for
an act or omission of the defendant, a person once conceived would not
or should not have been born."'2 4 This language parallels other state
statutes 25 by protecting prenatal health care practitioners for their intentional or negligent conduct resulting in a "failed" abortion-either
failure to give information to a parent which would influence the decision whether or not to abort or failure to successfully perform an abortion.2' Additionally, the language "once conceived," as supported by
the legislative history, demonstrates that the clear purpose of the Freind
tative Harper's "twisted sense of morality" protects "those who would take the
lives of the innocent ... [while advocating that] it is more cruel to prevent an
abortion than it is to kill an unborn baby." Id. at 313.
The Senate debate was by no means more congenial. Senator Fumo derided the Freind Amendment as a "crazy scheme" brought on by "the frustration of some people with what the Constitution and what the United States
Supreme Court has said is the law of the land." LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE,
supra note 4, at 1964. Senator Bell summarized the pro-life argument by equating the bill with "a simple question, whether we should or should not save the
life of an unborn child." Id. at 1963.
For a discussion of the history of the anti-wrongful birth statute prohibiting

wrongful birth actions, see supra notes 2 & 4 and accompanying text.
21. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). For the text
of this provision, see supra note 5.

22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b). For the text of this provision, see
supra note 6.
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8306. For the text of this provision, see supra
note 7.
24. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a).
25. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.130 (Vernon Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 21-55-1 to 21-553 (1987 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1988).

These state statutes differ from the Freind Amendment in several respects.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (expressly imposing liability for wrongful conception, maternal death and untreatable disease, defect or deficiency); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.424 ("negligent conduct" rather than "act or omission" protected;
express liability imposed for wrongful conception and negligent treatment of in
utero defect); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 ("negligent conduct" rather than "act
or omission"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-55-1 to 21-55-3 ("conduct" instead of "act or omission" and "wrongful conception" claims prohibited); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 ("person would not have been permitted to have been
born alive but would have been aborted").
26. Representative Freind hypothesized a worst-case scenario. LEGISLATIVE

JOURNAL-HOUsE, supra note 1,at 306. Representative Freind gave an example of
a doctor who performs an amniocentesis revealing a deformity. Id. Rather than
telling this to the parents, the doctor lies to them and tells them all is well. Id.
As a result the parents bring the child to term and it is born severely handi-

capped. Id. Under this scenario, the parents cannot sue the doctor unless the
deformity could have been treated in utero. Id. at 308.
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Amendment is to leave wrongful conception claims unaffected by the
27
statute.
The wrongful birth provision goes on to state that it does not "prohibit any cause of action or award of damages for the wrongful death of
a woman, or on account of physical injury suffered by a woman or a
child, as a result of an attempted abortion."12 8 The legislative history
indicates that by this provision the legislature intended to leave unaffected all prenatal malpractice actions other than those involving either
the failure of a health practitioner to provide material information influencing the decision to abort or negligence while performing an unsuc29
cessful abortion.
The wrongful birth provision leaves open the possibility of stateinitiated disciplinary proceedings against a health care practitioner for
intentional misrepresentation leading to the wrongful birth of a child.
Available disciplinary measures include license revocation or suspen30
sion, and criminal and civil penalties.
The wrongful life provision forbids a plaintiff from suing on a claim
alleging that "but for an act or omission of the defendant, the person
would not have been conceived or, once conceived, would or should
have been aborted." 3' This provision confirms the result reached in
Speck by precluding a child from suing for damages on a wrongful life
27. Representative Freind, responding to a question raised by Representative Gruitza whether under the Freind Amendment a person could sue a physician for negligently performing a failed tubal ligation (sterilization procedure)
on a wrongful conception claim, answered: "[It is] our intention not to preclude
in any way that type of lawsuit ... we were very careful about this." Id. at 309.
For a discussion of wrongful conception claims and damages recoverable, see
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
29. LEGISLATIVEJOURNAL-HOusE, supra note 1, at 306 (doctor liable for failing to test or treat which would make possible prevention, cure or amelioration
of any disease, defect, deficiency or handicap).
30. Disciplinary proceedings against physicians may be brought under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.901-907 (Purdon Supp. 1989). A physician is defined as "a medical doctor or a doctor of osteopathy." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 422.2 (Purdon Supp. 1988). The State Board of Medicine may impose disciplinary measures on any board-regulated medical doctor if the practitioner
makes "misleading, deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the practice of the profession." Id. § 422.41(2). A similar provision allows the State
Board of Osteopathic Examiners to impose disciplinary measures on osteopaths.
Id. § 271.15(a)(2). Disciplinary measures include:
(1) license revocation, id. §§ 271.15(c)(3), 422.42(a)(3);
(2) public reprimand, id. §§ 271.15(c)(2), 422.42(a)(2);
(3) criminal fines or imprisonment upon conviction of a medical doctor, id.
§ 422.39(a) (up to $5,000 or imprisonment not more than six months for first
offense and up to $5,000 to $20,000 or imprisonment for six months to one year
for second offense), or an osteopath, id. § 271.11 (a) ($1,000 or imprisonment
not more than six months for first offense and up to $2,000 or imprisonment for
six months to one year for second offense); or
(4) imposition of civil penalties, id. §§ 271.1 1(c), 422.39(b) (up to $1,000).
31. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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claim.
The third provision of the Freind Amendment bars a tortfeasor who
wrongfully or negligently injures a person while in utero from asserting
as a defense or as a mitigating factor that the injured "person could or
should have been aborted."
IV.

' 33

IMPACT OF THE FREIND AMENDMENT

The Freind Amendment significantly limits prenatal tort actions in
Pennsylvania and may produce other far reaching consequences. The
Freind Amendment furthers two primary purposes. First, it works as a
tort reform measure designed to curtail the liability crisis. 3 4 The liabil-

ity crisis has been particularly burdensome in the area of prenatal health
care.3 5 Second, the Freind Amendment promotes the legislative policy
favoring childbirth over abortion 3 6 by implicitly recognizing (1) that
birth of a healthy or deformed child is not a legally cognizable injury and
(2) that it is unfair to grant relief to parents who would have aborted a
deformed fetus had they known of the deformity but deny that same
relief to parents who would not have aborted the fetus under any set of
circumstances. 3 7 The following section will discuss the Freind Amendment in terms of its effect on prenatal tort liability, its probable effect on
the deterrence of malpractice, its effect on a woman's constitutional
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy within the context of a
doctor-patient relationship and its effect on the public policy of cur32. For a discussion of the Speck court's rejection of the wrongful life claim,
see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
Following the amendment's prohibitions of wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions, there is a definitional section stating: "A person shall be deemed to be
conceived at the moment of fertilization." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(c).
Although there was vociferous objection to this language by Representative
O'Donnell prophesying "the beginning of the end of the abortion debate" by
establishing human life at conception, Representative Freind stated this language applied "[o]nly with respect to the purpose of this amendment." LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUsE, supra note 1, at 309.
33. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8306.
34. See P.

DANZON,

NEW

EVIDENCE

ON THE FREQUENCY

AND SEVERITY OF

29 (1986) (Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation) (despite some tort reforms, frequency and severity of malpractice
claims have doubled over last decade).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

35. See generally K. FINEBERG, J. PETERS, J. WILI.SON & D. KROLL, OISTETRIcs/GYNECOLOGY AND TIHE LAW 8 (1984) (very broad liability exposure in pre-

natal care due to necessary use of invasive procedures and involvement of
mother and child as two potential plaintiffs).
36. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (based on policy
favoring childbirth over abortion, no public welfare funds shall be expended for
performance of abortion).
37. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn.
1986) (wrongful birth cause of action requires proof that fetis would have been
aborted had parents known of deformity).
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tailing medical malpractice liability while promoting childbirth over
abortion.
A.

PrenatalTort Liability Following the Freind Amendment

The Freind Amendment overrules that portion of the Speck decision
that permits a wrongful birth cause of action. The amendment, however, preserves other portions of the Speck decision. There were two
alleged negligent acts in Speck: a negligent sterilization procedure which
gave rise to a wrongful conception claim, and an unsuccessful abortion
which gave rise to a wrongful birth claim. 38 The Speck court never separated the two claims. 39 Therefore, the scope of relief granted to the
plaintiffs under the entire cause of action arguably fits within a wrongful
conception claim which is still permitted under the Freind Amendment.
In addition, the Freind Amendment does not in any way affect the Mason
4°
decision, because that case involved only a wrongful conception claim.
Following the Freind Amendment, a plaintiff may sue a physician or
health practitioner for negligence resulting in a failed sterilization, i.e.,
for wrongful conception. The gravamen of a wrongful conception claim
is that but for the act or omission of the defendant, a person would not
or should not have been conceived. Wrongful conception claims have
been successful in the lower courts 4 1 and have been upheld in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 The requisite act or omission could
be a misdiagnosis of risks attendant to bearing a child which influences a
decision to procreate. Another more common area of liability would be
an unsuccessful sterilization procedure resulting in the birth of an unplanned child.
Damages for wrongful conception vary according to the physical
character of the unplanned child. Under Speck, the parents of a deformed
or diseased child may recover any expenses relating to prenatal care.
These could include all medical expenses from preconception to birth,
any medical expenses for continuing treatment of the child, any pain
and suffering incurred by the parents during prenatal and postnatal periods and damages for the emotional distress of the parents upon learning of and living with their child's deformity or disease.43
If the unplanned child is healthy, under Mason, child rearing expenses are not recoverable since any cost of raising a healthy child are
38. Speck, 497 Pa. at 82, 439 A.2d at 113. For a discussion of the facts of
Speck, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. Speck, 497 Pa. at 83, 439 A.2d at 113.

40. For a discussion of the 1asmi decision, see supa notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of wrongful conception claims and their treatment in
the lower courts, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
42. See .llasou, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974: Speck, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110,
43. For a discussion of daniages awarded by the Speck decision, see snpra
note I I and acconipanving text.
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offset per se by the "joy, companionship, and affection" provided by the
child. 44 However, any prenatal or postnatal medical expenses, pain and
and lost wages
suffering incident to carrying and giving birth to the child
45
are recoverable under the wrongful conception claim.
In utero tort claims are also left unaffected by the Freind Amendment. 4" Any misdiagnosis by a physician for a treatable deformity or disease is actionable by the child in his or her own right under normal tort
principles. Also, any negligent in utero treatment is actionable by the
child. 4 7 The Freind Amendment precludes a physician from asserting as
an affirmative defense that no damages are recoverable on the grounds
that the injured child "could or should have been aborted."148
B.

The Effect of the FreindAmendment in Deterring PrenatalMalpractice

As stated above, the tort liability of a prenatal health care practitioner is still very broad. Critics charge that wrongful birth and wrongful life prohibitions work against deterring tortious conduct on the part
of health care practitioners who treat and diagnose prenatal health
They argue that wrongful birth prohibitions will erode the
problems.4
"standard of good medical practice ...
' 5°
counseling and diagnosis.

[in] the performance of prenatal

It is submitted that the alleged erosion of medical standards in prenatal medical care is grossly overstated by those who fear that wrongful
and
birth prohibitions will allow doctors practicing in the areas of5 "birth
1
conception .

.

. [to] do all the malpractice .

.

. [they] want."

As stated above, physicians are liable for any negligent treatment or
misdiagnosis of a treatable condition that gives rise to an in utero injury.
As the state of prenatal medical care advances, a wide variety of maladies
may be treated or cured in utero by a physician. 5 2 Under the Freind
44. Mason, 499 Pa. at 487, 453 A.2d at 976. The V'lason court stated: "In

light of this Commonwealth's public policy, which recognizes the paranlount imnportance of the family to society, we conclude that the benefits of joy, companionship, and affection which a normal, healthy child can provide must be
deemed as a matter of law to outweigh the costs of raising that child." Id.
45. For a discussion of damages awarded under the .llason decision, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. See I.EGISI.ATIVF JOUIRNAI.-HotusiE., .st/ft( note I, at'308-09 (statement by
Representative Freind that in utero iort claims are unafiected).
47. Id.
48. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8306 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
49. See, e.g., Bell, Letislative hnrosioIs hI11 the Comiimon Law (/ Medical ,llalpracfice: Thoughts .-lbout the De/erreni L'Ifect ofTori Liability 35 SvR\ctUsE I. Ri.:\'. 939.
965-70 (1984) (deterrence of inalpraclice demonstratcd by incrcased use of certain medical procedures in New York llhowing recoginition of wronglil birth
and wrongful life claims).
rongfid Birth .liions. supra note 2, at 2023.
50. See Note,
51 . IL.EGISi.ArTIVE.iJOIURNAi.-SENAIF:., SIPW noe 4, at 1964.

52. Potentially

trcatablc disorders include flal hydrops incidei tto Rh in-

compatibility, congen ital adrenal hyl)erplasia. citain tIypes of cardiac arrhydh-
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Amendment, a physician who negligently fails to conduct tests designed
to reveal such maladies is liable for injuries which result from the failure
to discover. Ultrasound and amniocentesis, two typical prenatal testing
procedures, can reveal a broad range of disorders, both treatable and
53
untreatable.
Under the Freind Amendment, any physician with knowledge of a
treatable disorder is fully liable under ordinary tort principles. However,
even if the disorder is untreatable, although no private cause of action
may exist against the physician for failing to reveal this information, the
parent can go before the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure or the State Board of Osteopathic Examiners for the enforcement
of a wide range of disciplinary sanctions, including revocation of the
physician's license.5 4 These sanctions may be imposed not only for intentional misrepresentation under the express terms of the Freind
Amendment, but also for any "immoral or unprofession conduct" failing to conform to "a quality standard of the profession" or for
"provid[ing] a medical service beneath the accepted standard of care." ' 5 5
Thus, there should be no marked change in the deterrence of tortious conduct of physicians performing prenatal diagnosis and treatment
of in utero ailments. In utero tort claims for misdiagnosis and mistreatment are still available. Moreover, in cases involving negligently conducted abortions, the standard of due care in a traditional negligence
action is still enforceable by the state licensing board, even though no
private cause of action exists.
C.

ConstitutionalImplications of the FreindAmendment Involving the Right
of Privacy Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Critics charge that statutes prohibiting wrongful birth actions deny
women due process rights of privacy under the fourteenth amendment
by infringing upon the right to decide whether to terminate a pregmias, fetal hydronephrosis, congenital hydrocephalus and diaphragmatic hernia.
For a collection of articles discussing new developments in treating some disorders, see 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 481-612 (1986) Uoseph D.
Schulman, guest editor of issue devoted to fetal therapy).

53. See id.
54. For a discussion of disciplinary sanctions imposed on health care practitioners for intentional misrepresentation, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 422.41(8) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The Freind
Amendment prevents a physician charged before a professional licensing body
with intentional misrepresentation from asserting the amendment as a defense.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). This provision
should not be interpreted as a limitation on a licensing board's authority to discipline its licensees for any conduct over which the board is given jurisdiction in
its own relevant legislation. While such an interpretation is possible taking a
strict approach to construction of the statutory language, it is submitted that this
would be an unreasonable construction in light of the fact that the Freind
Amendment's clear purpose is to affect only private rights of action.
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nancy. 5" They contend that statutes such as the Freind Amendment
constitute state action under Reitman v. Mulkey 5 7 because state action
need not directly affect a fundamental right but may become so significantly involved with a private action as to carry "the imprint of the
state." 5 8 They further argue that this state action unduly burdens a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child by curtailing the free flow
59
of all relevant information necessary to make an informed decision.
In Reitman, a voter-approved referendum amending the California
Constitution allowed a home owner to sell his home "to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." 60 The Reitman Court
held that while the state was permitted "a neutral position with respect
to private racial discriminations '" 6 1 under the Constitution, if it became
state
significantly involved so as to establish a "right to discriminate," 62
action could be found for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
It is submitted that the Reitman analysis for determining whether
state action exists is wholly inapposite to a constitutional analysis of the
Freind Amendment. The Freind Amendment does not encourage intentional infringement of a fundamental right in the way that the statute in
Reitman encouraged discriminatory housing practices. Absence of a tort
action for wrongful birth does not encourage a physician to fail to report
abnormalities that might lead to an abortion decision, because intentional misrepresentation by a physician regarding the health of a fetus
may result in the revocation of the physician's license. Further, the
Freind Amendment does not directly regulate conduct or in any way
impose the state in the doctor-patient relationship. 63 It is well estab56. For an excellent exposition of arguments challenging the constitutionality of anti-wrongful birth statutes, see Note, Wrongful Birth Actions, supra note 2,
at 2023-27.
57. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
58. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 19 (Minn.
1986) (Amdahl, J., dissenting). In Hickman, the first jurisdiction to test the constitutionality of a wrongful birth prohibition, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota anti-wrongful birth statute. Id. at 11.
The Hickman court found no direct state action affecting a fundamental right.
Any possible effect on a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child occurred by reason of private and not state action. Id. at 13. Thus, the court held
that the fourteenth amendment due process analysis of infringement of a fundamental right did not apply. Id.
59. See id. at 19 (Amdahl, J., dissenting) (statute prohibiting wrongful birth
actions directly infringes informed decision making process under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
60. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370.
61. Id. at 374-75 (adopting lower court's analysis).
62. Id. at 381.
63. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.
476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (state requirement that certain printed information be
recited to woman before performance of abortion wedged state's message discouraging abortions into privacy of informed consent dialogue between woman
and physician).
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lished that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."

64

Assuming that the Freind Amendment constitutes state action, critics contend that this purported state action denies women due process
rights of privacy under the fourteenth amendment pursuant to City of
Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc. 6 5 by unduly burdening
the right to decide whether to bear a child. By removing the tort liability
for wrongful birth, critics argue that the statute will restrict the flow of
"information necessary to make informed procreative decisions" as physicians either intentionally or negligently fail to disclose information influencing a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 6"
In City of Akron, the Court invalidated a city ordinance requiring a
doctor to recite a litany of "facts" including a statement averring "that
the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception" and to
describe in detail "the anatomical and physiological characteristics of
the . . .unborn child" before obtaining a woman's valid informed consent. 6 7 The Court held this provision to be unconstitutional state action

since it was "designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether." ' 8 Further, the "unborn child"
language in the ordinance was inconsistent with Roe v. Wade.3 According to the City ofAkron Court, Roe v. Wade prohibits a state from justifying
its regulation of abortion by adopting a theory of when life begins. 7"
The ordinance also intruded upon the discretion of a physician in treating his pregnant patients by putting him in an "undesired and uncomfortable straightjacket. "' 7 1 The Court concluded that the statute "placed
'obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled
to rely for advice in connection with her decision.' "72
It is submitted that the Freind Amendment is easily distinguishable
from the ordinance in City of Akron. First, City of Akron involved state
action in the form of a city ordinance that forced a doctor to recite cer73
tain "facts" to the woman before medical treatment could be given.
The Freind Amendment does not regulate in any way the doctor-patient
relationship. The Freind Amendment allows free and open discourse
64. Blum v.Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shelley v.Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,13 (1948)).
65. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
66. Note, [bongid Birlhl ctions, supra note 2,at 2022.
67. CilO oj'Akron, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5.
68. Id. at 444.
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. Ci ' ofAkron, 462 U.S. at 444.
71. Id. at 445 (quoting Planned Parenthood N. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67
n.8 (1976)).
72. Id. (quoting Whalen v.Roe,429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977) (brackets in
original)).
73. For a discussion of the definition of state action, see supra notes 57-64
and accompanying text.
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between the doctor and the patient of all relevant factors influencing the
decision to abort. Furthermore, under the Freind Amendment, women
are still protected from intentional misrepresentation by physicians.
This protection shields women from coercion or manipulation resulting
in "involuntary" decisions to bear deformed children. Thus, the decision-making process regarding procreative decisions is free from coercion by the state or any deliberate manipulation by another party.
Moreover, any decline in the quality of prenatal detection of untreatable
deformities caused by the Freind Amendment only indirectly influences
a woman's decision.
D.

Furtheranceof Legitimate State Policy

States are afforded broad discretion in deciding whether to extend
tort principles to new causes of action and to create immunities
designed to further legitimate state policies.7 4 Reigning in skyrocketing
medical costs and promoting childbirth are two policies furthered by the
75
Freind Amendment.
The extension of tort law principles to new causes of action is dictated, in large part, by policy considerations. 76 Policy considerations
77
determine what types of "injuries" should be compensable.
78
The stated policy of Pennsylvania favors childbirth over abortion.
Prior to the Freind Amendment, a wrongful birth plaintiff had to prove
that but for the act or omission of the defendant, a child "would" or
"should" have been aborted. In order to prove that a deformed child
"would" have been aborted, the aggrieved mother had to demonstrate
that she actually would have aborted the child had she known of the
deformity. Thus, under prior law there was a paradoxical result in the
case of a mother who would not have had an abortion regardless of a
deformity, because she would have been denied recovery even though
the state policy favoring childbirth had been furthered.9 All that the
Pennsylvania General Assembly has done is to declare that a deformed
74. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn.
1986) (Simonett, J., concurring) ("application of tort rules to create new tort
liability depends on the social, cultural, and religious concerns of the people.
concerns which a legislature under our system of government is especially
designed to reflect").
75. See Bell, supra note 49, a- 939-40 (discussing insurance crisis in New
York).
76. For a discussion of the policy reasons underlying the Speck decision,
which recognized a wrongful birth cause of action, see supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice Nix's criticism of the Speck court
for "judicially legislating" a new cause of action, see supra note 13.
77. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 15 (Sinioneti, J., concurring).

78. See PA. S'rvr. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (based on policy
favoring childbirth over abortion, no public welfare funds shall be expended for
performance of abortion).
79. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 15.
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child should never be aborted, leaving the actual decision whether to
abort up to the mother.
It is submitted that by deciding that the birth of a child is not a
legally cognizable injury, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has
avoided the paradox of "punishing" a woman who decides to carry a
fetus to term regardless of its health, and has acted well within its sovereign prerogative.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Freind Amendment obviously impacts prenatal tort liability in
Pennsylvania by prohibiting wrongful birth and wrongful life tort actions. However, it will not appreciably diminish the incentive to provide
quality prenatal health care because wrongful conception and in utero
injury claims are still available. Moreover, the failure of a physician to
reveal information about an untreatable disease to a parent, which prior
to the Freind Amendment would have given rise to a claim for wrongful
birth, can be redressed by the state agencies which regulate the licensure and practice of physicians.
The Freind Amendment should be upheld as constitutional for two
reasons. First, it does not constitute state action under the fourteenth
amendment. Second, the free flow of information enabling a woman to
make an informed decision on whether to terminate a pregnancy is protected by existing disciplinary measures.
The refusal of the General Assembly to recognize claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life furthers legitimate state policies promoting
childbirth over abortion while limiting excessive medical malpractice
costs. Thus, the Freind Amendment serves legitimate state purposes
and is within the power of the Pennsylvania General Assembly to promote the general welfare of its citizens.
John Lyons
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